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SITUATION

I.

NEUTRAL DUTIES AND STATE CONTROL
OF ENTERPRISE
States A and B are at war. Other States are
neutral. State C has an island colony, Camla,
where there are oil wells operated by the Seeoil
Co., a privately incorporated concern in 'vhich the
C government owns 55 percent of the stock and
selects one-half of the directors.
(a) State A sends a mission to Camla to purchase the entire outpllt of the wells for the use of
its navy. As the Seeoil Co. is about to make the
arrangement, State B protests to State C that such
a transaction would be a violation of C's neutrality
obligations.
(b) The Seeoil Co. sends oil to State D, adjacent to State A, to be refined. The Cora, a tanker
owned by the Seeoil Co. and carrying a cargo of
crude oil, is encountered en route from Camla to
State D by the By~ro1~, a cruiser of State B. The
Byron~ seizes the Cora on grounds of carrying contraband. The Cora though not resisting visit and
search, informed the Byro1~, when first summoned
to lie to, that the Cora was a public vessel of
State C.
(c) A tanker of State E, the Elrod, carrying a
cargo of gasoline which the owners of the vessel
have purchased from the Seeoil Co. and are transporting to an island airplane base of State A, is
visited, searched, and finally seized on grounds of
unneutral service by the Bax, a cruiser of State B.
1
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Instead of placing a prize cre'v on board, the Bax
directs the Elrod to proceed to a designated port
of State B and sends Ollt an airplane periodically
to make certain that the El1~od is not deviating.
What are the legal rights in each case~
SOLUTION

(a) State 0 should cancel or refuse to have the

agreement made, thollgh it should have the opportunity to prove that the tra11saction was purely
commercial and nonpolitical in character. The evidence in this case, however, does not see1n to support any such contention on the part of State C.
(b) Visit and search of the Cora by the By1~ott~
'vas legal.
(c) The Elrod is not guilty of unneutral service.
It is not impossible that the ElTod was legally
under the control of the Bax. The question hinges
upon this point: Was the airplane sufficiently in
evidence to convince the captai11 of the Elrod that
he was 'vatched and under control~
NOTES

THE GROWTH OF STATE CONTROL OVER THE
INDIVIDUAL

That governmental controls over business and
enterprise, formerly in private hands, are increasing is an obvious fact today. The era of laissez
faire is gone. Governments are in business and
are regulating business on an ever augmenting
scale. The types of ownership and control are exceedingly diverse and vary from the direct State
ownership of practically everything in Soviet Russia to State licenses and trade subsidies fom1d in
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so-called capitalist countries. I11 the United
States, the Government owns and operates, for example, the Panama Railroad. The Federal Government also exercises control through the form of
corporations such as the Ten11essee Valley Authority. It establishes banks, like the Export-Import Bank, or supports semipublic financial institutions like the Federal Reserve banks. The
French Government has taken over the arms industry and owns stocl{ in great corporations like
the Potash concern. The boundary line bet\veen
\vhat is governme11tal and what is private can no
longer be dra\Vll \vith any degree of accuracy.
Governments may own concerns outright, as previously suggested, they may appoint some of the
directors and O\Vn a large share of the stock, as
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., or they may regulate
enterprise through commissions and other types of
administrative offices. Any number of examples
of State intervention through corporations, export
and import regulatio11s, trade monopolies, cartels,
and subsidies may be cited, but enough bas been
said to indicate the fact that more and more human activities are coming to be regarded as lyi11g
\vithin the sphere of government.
The effect upon international la'v of these
changes within states has been and must be tremendous. As 011e \vriter recently has said:
International society is in process of a transfor1nation
which international law can no longer afford to ignore. . . .
It is submitted that all the customary rules touching international state responsibility are, in fact, based upon a particular division of the spheres of state and individual.
These rules presuppose that the state has traditionally certain functions, broadly speaking, the conduct of foreign
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policy, the control of the ar1ned forces, and certain functions of executive government. . . .
Apart from the duties corresponding to these state functions, the citizens were free to do and move as they liked.
In particular, trade and industry _'vas their concern and
responsibility. ~Iercantilisn1 did not influence these international principles, partly because its reign was too brief and
not sufficiently universal, but mainly because the principles
of international state responsibility ·were developed during
the 19th century, the century of laissez-faire. (W. Friedmann, British Year Book of International Law, 1938, pp.
118-119.)

EFFECT OF STATE CONTROLS UPON
INTERI'-~ATIONAL LAW

The law between States can11ot help being affected by changes in the law within States. Internatiollal rules are not made in a vacuum, and are
11ecessarily the product of the way of life of the
international commlmity. The increasing domestic collectivism has affected both State in1munity
and State responsibility. States have bee11 prone
to extend the historic sovereign immunities,
granted to goverllillental age11cies in days 'vhe11
governmental business was small, to the ne'v forms
of State activity. At the same time, the more a
State has become involved i11 ne'v enterprises, the
more responsibility it has had to assume. The
problems of immunity were e11countered first, a11d
became acute in co11ection with the shipping business. \Vhen public vessels 'vere granted immunity
from local jurisdiction in the case of the Schoone~·
Excha1~ge vs. ]fcFaddo1~ (7 Cranch 116) no great
inconvenience in maritime affairs could arise, because the bulk of the 'vorld's shipping was in pri·vate l1ands. Later on, toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, whe11 public ships of a
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con1n1ercial character bega11 to appear, the difficulties of the immunity doctri11e became more apparent. If immunity was to be granted solely on the
basis of ov\rnership, then all gover11me11tally o'v11ed
vessels "\vould be free fron1 suits and local controls,
a most intolerable situation. The British and
. .A. 1nerica11 cotlrts, ho,vever, have continued to grant
immunity to public vessels whether warships or
freighters, though in practice the administrations
in these countries have recognized a distinction
on the basis of the use to which Government ships
are put.
The tendency, therefore, is to separate acts of
State from acts of a commercial sort and not to
claim i1nmu11ity for the latter. Belgian, Italian,
a11d Egyptian courts have taken the lead in assuining jurisdictio11 over ships which, though
o'vned by governments, are operating in what
seen1s to be a nonpolitical or business capacity.
The Soviet Union has not claimed immunity for its
commercial age11cies, and the Brussels Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning
the Immunities of Governments Vessels, "\vhich
went into effect in 1937, stated in article I that
"seagoing vessels owned or operated by States
* * * are stlbject in respect to claims relating
to the operation of such vessels * * * to the
same rules of liability and to the sa111e obligations
as those applicable to private vessels * * *"
(Hudson International Legislation, III, 1837).
Also article 26 of the I-Iarvard Draft Code (Americal1 Journal of International Law 1932, pp. 716)
states that:
A state need not accord the privileges and imn1unities to
such juristic persons as corporations or associations for
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profit separately organized by or under the authority of
another state, regardless of the nature and extent of governmental interest therein or control thereof.

In connection with legal immtmities therefore, a
line has been drawn bet,veen the actions of a government in its public capacity and those in a 1)rivate
capacity. In regard to the responsibility of States,
the issues have arisen later than they did with
imn1unities, and as yet the san1e distinction between the types of governn1ent operations l1as not
been so clearly apparent.
NEUTRALITY AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY

In connection with neutrality, questions of responsibility are grave indeed. According to the
principles of traditional neutrality, every extension of government into the realm of finance, trade,
and business should mean a duty not to permit the
sale or transfer of the articles or commodities under
such public control to a belligerent power. Logically, llnder such a doctrine, a completely socialist
State like Soviet Russia today could sell 11othing
and could permit the export of no products to States
engaged in a war in which Russia was neutral.
The la'v on tl1is st1bject, however, has not clearly
crystallized to date. Precedents are relatively few
and no dogmatic answer to the problem i11volving
the Seeoil Co. can be rendered.
Certain fundamental distinctions basic to the
la\v of neutrality need to be examined. First of
all, there is the distinction betwee11 the use of neutral territory as a base and its employment as a
source of commercial supply. Armies and expeditions may not go out fron1 neutral territory but
belligerent governments may obtain Sllpplies con1-
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mercially. Though goods obtained commercially
may be far more valuable to a belligerent than the
assistance obtained from an expedition, the distinction probably will continue to be recognized
because of its advantages to belligerents and neutrals alike. As long as States wish to buy and sell
from and to each other they doubtless vvill cling
to this convenient though not always strictly logical line of demarcation between the commercial and
the military.
Another underlying distinction has been that
between what a governme11t may do and what a
private citize11 may do. The law of neutrality
forbids neutral governments to give aid to a warring power, but permits private citizens to carry
on trade relations. In regard to the latter, neutral
governments have no responsibility except to apply
impartially any regulations or restrictions which
they may impose. These stipulations have been
incorporated into the following conventions:
Hague Convention V of 1907, Article 9. Every n1easure of
restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral power . . .
must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents.
Hague Convention XIII, Article 9. A neutral power must
apply impartially to the two belligerents the conditions, restrictions, or prohibitions made by it in regard to the admission into its ports, road-steads, or territorial waters, of
belligerent warships or of their prizes.
Article 6. The supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral power, of warships, ammunition, or war
material of any kind, is forbidden.

The question inevitably arises as to whether the
expansion of government controls obliterates this
distinction between governme11ts and private citizens. Are governments going to be permitted to
ass-ume a commercial character a11d so be free to
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sell to belligere11ts, or must the sale by any goverilmeiltally owned or controlled agency be completely
prohibited~ If the basic aim of the long-sta11ding
law is to thwart governn1ental contacts vvith a belligerent, then logically if the same rules are to persist, governmental instrumentalities must be prohibited from making deals \vith warring powers.
If the aim, however, 'vas merely to prevent political partiality, and if governments in business can
really act nonpolitically, should not State-owned
or operated concerns be allowed to function as do
private persons or concerns~
The answers to these questions by variotls authorities have differed. Prof. Lawrence Preuss, of
the University of ~Iichigan (Some Effects of Governmental Controls on Neutral Duties, Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1937,
pp. 108-119), tends to take the rather strict line
that State concerns must abstain entirely from
belligerent contacts, and the Harvard Draft Code
(American Journal of International Law, Supplement, July 1939, p. 239) also states ''The rule of
international law should be and probably is that a
state whe11 neutral is forbidden to do certain things,
no matter in what capacity or through what agency·
it does them.'' The drafters of this code, however,
\vent on to say by way of modification, that "It
might be argued that since a neutral state is not
under a duty to prevent its nationals from doing
certain things which it shotlld refrain from doing
itself, so it is not under a duty to refrain from
doing those acts in its private capacity, provided
that it accepts the consequence of submitting its
property to the belligerent rights of capture and
condemna:tion. ''
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A different line is taken by Friedn1ann ( op. cit.)
wl1o argues that abstention would be impractical,
that it "\vould penalize States u11duly for engaging
in socialistic experiments and would deprive otl1er
powers of needed supplies. It does seem as though
common sense and the actual behavior of States
dictate the drawing of some kind of a line between
a State's sovereign and private capacities. Socialist-minded nations will not feel bound to abstain
fro1n business contacts. The solutio11 of the problem in hand, therefo1 e, will be sought upo11 the
basis of what appear to be the actual needs and the
legitimate aims of States today.
1

THE CRITERION OF PRIVATE CAPACITY

The endeavor to discover whether a State is operating in its sovereign or personal character is
immensely difficult, but the elusive nature of the
problem should not be allowed to halt the search.
One must commence by enq11iring as to the fundanlental reason for the origin of the rule barring
governmental aid or sales to a State at war, and one
discovers that it was designed to prevent political
manipulation in favor of one of the parties to a
conflict. At the core of neutrality lies impartiality, and governmental assistance, eve11 though extended with an effort at helping both sides in lil{e
fashion, seemed incon1patible with the requirements
of genuine impartiality. Abstentio11 (for governments) became the rule. Political favoritis1n "\Vas
to be avoided, and with governments out of the picture, a11d 'vith most of the commercial area tlnder
private control, the State 'vas 11ot politically enmeshed in the conflict. A barrier against politt~cal
247670-40-2
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favors was the object, with the prohibition on gov ..
ernment aid serving merely as a means, not as an
end in itself.
If, as suggested, the 'nature of the deal, whether
political or commercial, and not the fact of government ownership or control, is to be the test for
determining legal responsibility, and if it is political favoritism and political assistance rather than
governmental Sllpervision as such which gives taint
to the transaction, then what is to be looked for
in this quest for a criterion as to private capacity
is the amount or extent of political bias or influence manifest in any given arrangement between
a belligerent government and a corporation or
agency owned or controlled by a neutral State.
The sending of armies, warships, and military supplies by one government to another is clearly political; likewise the granting of loanB by a government bank would be political, prin1a facie. All
such acts could properly be regarded as illegal
because they could only be made with a definite
political end in view. In an earlier age when the
functions of government were fewer and when they
were confined mainly to matters of police and defense, the legal ban on governn1ental assistance
affected only this relatively narrow range of political activity. Now that governments are engaged
in all sorts of enterprise taken over from the
private domain, they are increasil1gly involved in
matters more commercial than political. The prohibition against governmental transactions with a
belligerent, designed to prevent assistance for political purposes, is no longer so essential where
business and trading interests are concerned.
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To determine private capacity by means of bard
and fast .forn1ulae seems unsatisfactory. Percentages of stock, numbers of directors, or forms of
control do not in themselves furnish an adequate
index of the amount of political direction involved.
Where a government owns and operates a railway
in very businesslike style, transportatio11 of belligerent goods over such a line 'vould not appear to
affect the State's neutrality. On the other hand,
industries mainly under private o'vnership may be
guided or controlled indirectly by a gover11ment,
in a very partial manner. The questi011 to be
asked, therefore, is whether the government in any
given situation is active for political reasons. At
issue are affirmative, political acts. If the I1eutral governme11t merely allows its railways or shipping lines to operate without overt i11terference on
its part or if it follows a policy of laissez faire,
passively leaving matters to geography and the
course of events, neutrality duties would not be infringed. It is admitted that the abandonment of
a definite criterion such as govern111ent ownership
or a specified amount of ;control involves great
difficulties. It means a search into the motives
and into the details of each particular act, and it
would be far easier to apply some mechanically
rigid rule by which one might l{now immediately
whether a certain act 'vere illegal or not, but in the
light of governments' obyious desire and need to
continue trading, it is essential to seel{ a criterion
of private capacity 'vhich fits the practical 11eeds
of the 'vorld today.
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APPLICATION OF PRIVATE CAPACITY CRITERION TO THE PRESENT CASE

The transactio11 bet\veen State A a11d the Seeoil
Co. is of doubtful legality, and in the circu1nstances
State C should prevent it. This co11tract seems 110
ordinary one of a com1nercial 11ature. The political infltlence of State C in its official capacity
seems to show through the entire set of Ilegotiations. The fact that State A se11t a mission to
Camla brings in a11 elen1ent of diplomatic relations
between States whch evidently goes beyond a purely
business deal. Also the fact that State C is to
purchase the entire ot1tpt1t of the wells for the use
of its navy n1akes the contract seem decidedly political. In a situatio11 of this sort, State C should be
extremely careful and should not allo"\\7 any agreements to be made which haYe definitely un11eutral
implications. The law on this subject is ad1nittedly
fluid, but after more experience and \vith more
precedents, a private capacity criterio11 should
emerge as clearly as it already has in co1mection.
with immunity from ju1 isdiction.
State C should be given the opportunity to den10llstrate that the contract \Vas commercial. Tl1e deal
seems suspiciously political, and the burde11 of
proof is llpon State C, but the latter can cite precede11ts fron1 the \Var of 1914-18 to show that neutral
governn1ents may agree to sell to as \vell as to buy
from belligerent po,vers. Government-sponsored
organizations lil{e the N. 0. T. in the Netherla11ds
and the S. S. S. in S\vitzerland negotiated directly
with States at war, and on August 5, 1916, i11 an
agreement betwee11 Great Britain and N or\vay, the·
latter pron1ised to supply Britain \vith 85 percent
1
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of its exports of fish. (SeeP. G. Vig11ess, "Neutrality of N or,vay and the World War"; .Amry
Vandenbosch, ''Neutrality of the N etl1erlands Durillg the World War''; Harvard Draft Code, ''Rights
and Duties of Neutral States n1 Naval and Aerial
War"; American Journal of I11ternational Law,
Supplement, July 1939, pp. 235-245; Harvard
Draft Code, ''Competence of Courts in Regard to
Foreign States''; American Journal of Internatio11al La,v, Supplement 1932, Co1nments on Articles 12, 26, and 27; Friedn1a11n, op. cit., a11d Preuss
op. cit.)
VISIT AND SEARCH OF PUBLIC VESSELS

In the ligl1t of the evide11ce previously cited to
the effect that State-owned vessels engaged in commercial enter})rise are not to be regarded as immune from jtlrisdiction, it is apparent that a
tanker like the Cora, thougl1 o\vned by a company
in which the State owns a majority of the shares,
cannot claim immunity from visit and search. It
is to be treated as a private vessel. In the early
spring of 1940 warships of Great Britain intercepted Soviet vessels in the Pacific Ocean, visited
and searched them, and ordered then1 into port for
prize-court adjudication. The Government of the
Soviet Union allegedly protested that these ships
'vere immune from visit and search because of their
State ownership. Such a claim was inconsistent
'vith previollS Soviet policy in regard to its mercllant marine, and evidently was not taken seriously by any of the parties concerned at the time.
Exemption from the exercise of belligerent rights
of 'var for State-o'\vnecl merchant craft is unnec-
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essa1·y a11d 'vould be asking an unwarranted sacrifice from a belligerent naval power.
That State craft are not all entitled to the immunities accorded warships has been Tecognized
in international conventions:
Convention on Commercial Aviation, Havana 1928, Article III (b) : All state aircraft other than military, naval,
customs and police aircraft shall be treated as private aircraft and as such shall be subject to all the provisions of the
present convention.
Hague Convention XI, Relating to the Exercise of the
Right of Capture in naval war. Article II: The inviolability of postal correspondence does not exempt a neutral mail
ship fron1 the laws and customs of maritilne war as to neutral merchant ships in general. r.rhe ship, however, may not
be searched except whenever absolutely necessary, and then
only with as much consideration and expedition as possible.

THE "ALTMARK" CASE

On February 16th, 1940, the British destroyer
Cossack forced the German vessel .L4ltmark into
a Nor,vegian fjord and re1noved three-hllndred-odd
captives who were on board. The Altrnark had
formerly been a n1erchant tanker but at tl1e time of
the incident was a naval auxiliary flying the German official service flag. .Although the Altmark
case deals with a neutral State's duties in regard
to belligerent ships in territorial \Vaters, and
though it does not concern belligerent rights over
neutral public ships on the high seas, it is of considerable general importance and i11volves interesting problems concerning jurisdiction over vessels, both public and private, within the territorial
limits. The British governme11t and some international lawyers charged that Norway had failed in
its duties and that it should not have allowed the
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Altrnark to transport prisoners along its coast.
More careful examination of the situatio11, ho\vever, indicates that Norway bad no obligation to
halt the Altmark, to force it to leave, to inter11 it,
or to release the prisoners. Following is the opinion of Prof. Edwin Borchard of Yale University:
As a public ship the Altmark was free from visit and inspection except possibly to verify her conformity with Norway's neutrality regulations. Norway's jurisdiction over the
vessel was at best extremely limited and under no circumstances 'vould it seem that Norway was privileged to break
the relation between the master and the captives on board
and release them. Even if the ship had anchored or docked
in Bergen, that legal relationship could not have been legally
broken. In the Franco-Prussian War, a French war vessel
entered the Firth of Forth with German prisoners on board,
whereupon the German Consul at Leith asked Great Britain
to release the prisoners in accordance with Britain's alleged
neutral duty. The British government replied that the
French warship was privileged to enter and to remain for a
limited time, that the prisoners on board did not become free,
that 'vhile on board they were under French jurisdiction, and
that the neutral authorities had no right to interfere with
the1n. In an earlier case arising during the Crin1ean War,
Attorney General Cushing in an exhaustive opinion held that
a United States court had no po,ver to release the captive seamen on board the Russian vessel Sitka brought into San Francisco as a prize by a British man-of-war.
Nor is it material what the Altmark's papers showed, provided she was a public vessel. Even if she were a merchant
vessel, Norway as a coastal state had no power to punish her
for carrying false papers, or, in either event, for the false
character of the captain's answers to the questions put. The
British seamen were not technically prisoners of war because they were not part of the armed forces of a belligerent
nor ancillary thereto. Even if it should be said that the AUmark was violating international law by taking the1n to Germany instead of leaving them at the nearest port, it was
hardly Norway's duty to correct the violation. The term
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"prison ship" is not a tern1 of art and hardly clarifies the legal
position. The Altnwrk would seem to have been under no
duty to account to Norway for what she was carrying, nor
was Norway bound to inquire 'vhether she was passing
through territorial waters to escape capture. Such a 1notive
'vhich was doubtless accurate, does not diminish the privilege
of using the territorial waters for transit (American Journal
of Inte~national Law, April1940, pp. 292-294).

SEIZURE FOR CONTRABAND

Though there is no binding general international
agreement as to what articles should properly be
considered contraband, the seizure of both the Cora
and the El1·od appears legitimate. Oil and gasoline are now of the utmost importance in \Varfare
and may rightly be considered to be absolute contraband. The basis for the seizure of the Cora,
which was carrying oil to a State adjacent to a
belligerent, was that of continuous voyage, a doctrine recognized as applicable to absolute contraband in the unratified Declaration of London of
1909 and extensively invoked in the war of 1914-18
and in the war which began in September 1939.
The law is therefore clear in regard to the Cora
but is by no means as definite in regard to the
extensions of the doctrine of continuous voyage
in both great wars. In these two conflicts the .Allied States never proclaimed a formal blockade of
Germany but relied upon contraband, continuotis
voyage, and reprisal orders which carried the doctrine to almost unrecognizable lengths.
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CONTRABAND LISTS OF THE 1939-40 WAR

Great

Britai1~:
"SCHEDULE

I

"Absolute Contraband
" (a) All kinds of arms, ammunition, explosives, chemicals, or appliances suitable for use in chemical ·warfare and
machines for their manufacture or repair; component parts
thereof; articles necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients.
"(b) Fuel of all kinds; all contrivances for, or means o£,
transportation on land, in the water or air, and machines
used in their manufacture or repair; component parts
thereof; instruments, articles, or animals necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their
manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients.
" (c) All means of communication, tools, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers and other articles, machines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile operations; articles necessary or convenient
for their manufacture or use.
" (d) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt; also
metal, materials, dies, plates, machinery, or other articles
necessary or convenient for their manufacture.
"SCHEDULE

II

''Conditional Contraband
" (e) All kinds of food, foodstuffs, feed, forage, and clothing and articles and materials used in their production."
(The Department of State Bulletin, September 16, 1939,
Vol. I, No. 12, Publication 1377, pp. 250-251.)
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"ARTICLE

1

"The following articles and materials will be regarded as
contraband (absolute contraband) if they are destined for
enetny territory or the enemy forces:
"One. Arn1s of all kinds, their component parts and their
accessories.
"Two. Atninunition and parts thereof, bombs, torpedoes,
1nines and other types of projectiles; appliances to be used
for the shooting or dropping of these projectiles; powder and
explosives including detonators and igniting 1naterials.
"Three. 'Varships of all kinds, their component parts and
their accessories.
"Four. ~filitary aircraft of all kinds, their component parts
and their accessories; airplane engines.
"Five. Tanks, ar1nored cars and armored trains; arn1or
plah~ of all kinds.
"Six. Chemical substances for military purposes; appliances and machines used for shooting or spreading then1.
"Seven. Articles of military clothing and equipment.
"Eight. ~feans of cormnunication, signaling and military
ilhnnination and their component parts.
"1Vine. ~feans of transportation and their component parts.
"Ten. Fuels and heating substances of all kinds, lubricating
oils.
"Eleven. Gold, silver, n1eans of payn1ent, evidences of
indebtedness.
''Twelve. Apparatus, tools, n1achines and materials for the
manufacture or for the utilization of the articles and products
named in numbers one to eleven.

''ARTICLE 2
"Article one of this law beco1nes article 22 paragraph one
of the Prize Law Code.
"This law becomes effective on its protnulgation."
The Government of the Reich on September 12, 1939, n1ade
an announcetnent relating to conditional contraband which
read in part :
"1"'he following is accordingly announced:
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"The following articles and 1naterials will be regarded as
contraband (conditional contraband) subject to the conditions of article 24 of the Prize Law Code of August 28, 1939
(Reichsgesetzblatt part one page 1585) :
"Foodstuffs (including live anin1als) beverages and tobacco
and the like, fodder and clothing; articles and 1naterials used
for their preparation or manufacture.
"This announce1nent beco1nes effective on Septe1nber 14,
1939."

(The Department o£ State Bulletin, Septe1nber 2:3, 1939,
Vol. I, No. 13, Publication 1380, p. 285.)

Fra'nce:
"The Government of the F'rench Republic makes known
to interested parties, that, during the course of hostilities,
it will consider as articles of contraband the following
objects:
"AnsoLUTE CoNTRABAND
" (a) All sorts of arms, munitions, explosives, chemical
products or apparatuses which may be utilized in chemical
warfare, and n1achinery intended for their 1nanufacture or
repair; component parts of these articles, articles necessary
or appropriate for their utilization; substances or ingredients employed in their manufacture ; articles necessary or
appropriate for the production or utilization of these substances or ingredients ;
"(b) Combustibles of all sorts; all apparatuses or means
permitting of the transportation on land, water or in the
air, and all machinery utilized for their 1nanufacture or
repair; component parts of these articles; instruments, articles or animals necessary or appropriate for their employment, substances or ingredients untilized in their manufacture; articles necessary or appropriate for the production
or employment of the said substances or ingredients;
" (c) All means of communication, tools, imple1nents, instruments, equipment, geographic maps, pictures, papers and
other articles, machinery or documents necessary or appropriate for the conduct of enemy operations, articles necessary or appropriate for their n1anufacture and their
employment;
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" {d) Coins, gold and silver ingots, bunk notes, bonds, as
well as n1etals, materials, specie, metal sheets, machinery or
other articles necessary or appropriate for their manufacture.
"CoNDITIO~ AI., CoNTRABAND

"All sorts of foodstuffs, provisions, products for feeding
animals, fodder, clothing, us well as objects and material
utilized for their production."
{The Departn1ent of State Bulletin, Nove1nber 18, 1939,
Vol. I, No. 21, Publication 1405, p. 555.)

AMERICAN POSITION CONCERNING BRITISH
"'BLOCKADE"

Note of

Decen~berr BJ 1939:

"My Government has noted with regret that by its Orderin-Council of Novernber 28, the British Government has
undertaken to intercept all ships and all goods emanating
:from German ports, and ports in territory under German
occupation, after December 4, 1939, and all ships from whatever port sailing after December 4 having on board goods of
German origin or German ownership, and to require that
such goods be discharged in a British or allied port and
placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court. This
order if applied literally would subject A1nerican vessels to
diversion to British ports if they are found to be carrying
goods of German origin or German o'vnership, regardless of
the place of lading of such goods or the place of destination
and regardless of the ownership of the goods at the time that
the vessel is intercepted, the "\Vords 'enemy origin', according
to the order, covering any goods having an origin in any territory under enemy control, and the words 'enemy property'
including goods belonging to any person in any such
territory.
"Interference with neutral vessels on the high seas by belligerent powers must be justified upon some recognized belligerent right. It is conceded that a belligerent government
has a right to visit and search neutral vessels on the high seas
for the purpose of determining whether the vessel is carrying
contraband of war to an opposing belligerent, is otherwise.

21
engaged in some form of unneutral service, or has broken or
is attempting to break an effective blockade of an enemy port
and, if justified by the evidence, to take the vessel into port.
"A1nerican vessels are at the present time. prohibited by
our domestic law from engaging in any kind of commerce on
the 'vest coast of Europe between Bergen, Norway, on the
north, and the northern part of Spain on the south. This
prohibition applies to neutral as 'vell as to belligerent ports
'vithin that area. Consequently, justification for interfering 'vith American vessels or their cargoes on grounds of
breach of blockade can hardly arise. Likewise the question
of contraband does not arise with respect to goods en route
from Ger1nany to the United States.
"vVhatever may be said for or against measures directed by
one belligerent against another, they may not rightfully be
carried to the point of enlarging the rights of a belligerent
over neutral vessels and their cargoes, or of otherwise penalising neutral states or their nationals in connection with their
legiti1nate activities.
"Quit.e apart from the principles of international law thus
involved, the maintenance of the integrity of which cannot
be too strongly emphasized at this time 'vhen a tendency to'vard disrespect for law in international relations is threatening the security of peace-loving nations, there are practical
reasons which move my Governn1ent to take notice of the
Order-in-Council here in question. In many instances orders
for goods of Ger1nan origin have been placed by American
nationals for which they have made pay1nent in whole or in
part or have otherwise obligated the1nselves. In other instances the goods purchased or which might be purchased cannot readily, if at all, be duplicated in other markets. These
nationals have relied upon such purchases or the right to purchase for the carrying on of their legitimate trade, industry
and professions. In these circumstances, the British Govern1nent will readily appreciate why my Government cannot view
with equanimity the measures contemplated by the Order-inCouncil, which, if applied, cannot fail to add to the many inconveniences and damages to which innocent trade and coinInerce are already being subjected.
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"~Iy

Government is, therefore, under the necessity of requesting that measures adopted by the British Government
shall not cause interference 'vith the legitimate trade of its
nationals and of reserving meanwhile all its rights and the
rights of its nationals whenever, and to the extent that they
1nay be infringed."
(Deparbnent of State Bulletin, December 9, 1939, Vol. I,
No. 24, Publication 1413, pp. 651-652.)

At.de

~ie1noire,

January 20, 1940:

''This Government feels constrained to express its serious
concern at the treatment by the British authorities of American shipping in the ~fediterranean area, and particularly
at Gibraltar. It has already made clear its position as
regards the legality of intBrference by the British Government 'vith cargoes moving from one neutral country to
another, in its Ambassador's Note number 1569 of November
20, 1939. In addition, it now regrets the necessity of being
forced to observe not only that British interference, carried
out under the theory of contraband control, has worked a
wholly unwarrantable delay on American shipping to and
fron1 the ~Iediterranean area; but also that the effect of
such action appears to have been discriminatory.
"Since ample tin1e has elapsed to permit the setting up of
an efficient system of control, it would seem that the present
situation can no longer be ascribed to the confusion attendant on early organization difficulties.
"From information reaching this Govern1nent it appears
that A1nerican vessels proceeding to neutral ports en route
to or :from ports of the United States have been detained
at Gibraltar :for periods varying :from nine to eighteen
days; that cargoes and mail have been removed from such
ships; that official mail :for American missions in Europe
has been greatly delayed; that in some instances American
vessels have been ordered to proceed, in violation of American law, to the belligerent port of Marseille to unload cargoes and there to experience :further delays. It is further
reported that cargoes on Italian vessels receive more favorable consideration that similar or equivalent cargoes carried
by American ships, and that Italian vessels are permittBd
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to pass through the control w·ith far less inconvenience and
delay.
"There is attached a list of American vessels en route to
neutral ports detained by the British Contraband Control
during the period Nov. 15 to Dec. 15, from which it will be
seen that the average delay imposed has amounted to approximately 12.4 days. From information in possession of
this govern1nent, it is established that Italian vessels detained during the same period were held for an average
delay of only 4 days.
"This government must expect that the British Government will at least take suitable and prompt measures to
bring about an immediate correction of this situation. It
will appreciate receiving advices that the situation has been
corrected."
ENCLOSURE:
List of American vessels, as stated.
DEPARTl\IENT OF STATE,

Washington, Jan. 30,1940.
American vessels reported to the Department of State to
have been detained by the British Blockade Control in the
Mediterranean for examination of papers and cargo, Nov.
15-Dec. 15, 1939 :
S. S. Express--(Nov. 12-21), ten days. An1erican Export
Line-general cargo-detained by the British authorities
at Malta. Held pending receipt of instructions from the
British Government. Had remaining on board 420 tons of
general cargo for Greece, Turkey and Rumania. Free to
depart Nov. 21 in view of declaration furnished. Departed
Nov. 23.
S. S. Nishmaha-(Nov. 11-23) thirteen days. Lykes
Brothers Steamship Company-cotton, paraffin, beef casings-detained by the British authorities at Gibraltar.
Large number of items of cargo seized. Free to depart
after Nov. 17 on captain's undertaking to unload at Barcelona cargo for that port, and to proceed to l\1arseille for
unloading seized items.
S. S. Examiner-(Nov. 17-Dec. 4) eighteen days. American Export Line-general cargo, oil, grease, rubber tires,.
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cotton goods-detained by the British authorities at Gibraltar. Eleven bags first-class mail removed.
S. S. Excambion-(Nov. 20-27) eight days, American
Export Line-general cargo, oil, films-detained by British
authorities at Gibraltar.
S. S. Exmouth-(Nov. 22--Dec. 5) fourteen days. An1erican Export Line-general cargo-detained by British
authorities at Gibraltar.
S. S. Extavia-(Nov. 29-Dec. 14) sixteen days. American
Export Line-mixed cargo-detained by the. British authorities at Gibraltar. Ship free to depart on giving Black
Diamond guarantee in respect to one item o£ cargo.
S. S. Exochorda-(Dec. 5-13) nine days. American Export Line-mixed cargo, burlap, tinplate, tobacco, oildetained by the British authorities at Gibraltar.
S. S. Exmoor-(Dec. 7-15) nine days. American Export
Line-1nixed cargo-detained by the British authorities at
Gibraltar.
S. S. Explorer- (Dec. 9-23) -fifteen days. A1nerican
Export Line-mixed cargo-detained by the British
authorities at Gibraltar.
(Department o£ State Bulletin, January 27, 19-:1:0, \Tol. II,
No. 31, Publication 1428, pp. 93-94.)

THE "CITY OF FLINT"

On October 9th, 1939, the .American n1erchant
steamer City of Flint was visited and searched by
a German cruiser at an estimated distance of 1,250
miles from New York. Tl1e Flinl, carrying a
mixed cargo destined for British ports, was seized
by the German cruiser on grounds of contraband,
and a German prize crew 'vas placed on board.
Between the 9th of October and the 4th of November 1939 the American ship was tal{el1 first to the
Norwegian port of Tromsoe, then to the Russian
city of Murmansk, and then after two days in the
last-named port, bacl{ along the Norwegian coast
as far as Haugesund where the Norwegian author-
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ities on November 4th released the Flint 011 the
grou11ds of the international la'v rules contained
in articles XXI and XXII of Hague Convention
XIII of 1907. Prizes may be taken to a neutral
harbor only because of an "inability to navigate,
bad conditions at sea, or lack of anchors or supplies.'' The entry of the Fli1~t into Haugesund on
N oven1ber 3 was not justified by the existence of
any one of these ,conditions. The original visit
a11d search and seizure of the Flint by the German
'varship, the placing of the prize cre'v on board,
and the conduct of that crew were apparently all
i11 accord vvith law. The stay in the harbor of
l\iurmansk, l1ovvever, 'vas of dotlbtfullegality. No
genuine distress or valid reason for refuge in a socalled neutral harbor is evident from the examination of the facts. Perhaps the Germans and the
Russians hoped to invoke the provisions of Article
XXIII of Hague Convention XIII which authorizes a 11eutral po,ver to permit "prizes to enter its
ports and roadsteads * * * when they are
brought there to be sequestrated pending the decision of a prize court.'' This article has never been
accepted generally as a part of international la'v
and 'vas specifically rejected by the United States
in ratifying the conventio11. The situation 'vas
con1plicated b~y the eqt1ivocal position of Soviet
Russia which was not a neutral in the traditional
se11se, in the European war. Under strict rules
of international la'v the U. S. S. R. was derelict
i11 regard to its neutral duties and should not have
permitted the Fl-i1~t either to enter lVIurmansl{ or to
find any sort of a haven there.
247670-40-3
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NORWEGIAN STATEMEN'I' ON THE "CITY OF
FLINT"
The Foreign Office finLls it correct to give the co1nplete account of how the German prize, Oity of Flint, has been handled by Norwegian authorities.
The Oity of Flint is an American vessel which, with a German prize crew aboard, c~une for the first ti1ne to Tron1soe on
Oct. 20 and asked for fuel and water. Per1nission 'vas given
in accordance with Norwegian neutrality rules of 1928 based
upon the international agree1nents about neutrality duties in
mariti1ne warfare of Oct. 18, 1907 (The Hague agreen1ent
~umber 13).
The Flint, however, was orderd to remain son1e hours longer than necessary for taking on fuel and water. Thus it
en1erged that it had British citizens aboard. Crews had been
taken off one or 1nore vessels 'vhich Ger1nan warships sank
and these British citizens, according to a request fron1 the
prize ship, were put ashore at Tromsoe.
The Oity of Flint left Tromsoe on Oct. 21 and, because the
stay there had been prolonged according to the N or,vegian
order, the ship obtained pern1ission to continue to sail within
N or\\'egian territories for t1renty-four hours reckoned on the
tin1e of departure from Tron1soe.
This 'Yas in accord with N or,vegian neutrality rules.
On the follow·ing day, which was Sunday, the Gern1an
Charge d'Affaires at Oslo said his government found it incorrect that the stay within Norwegian territorial waters be
Ji1nited this \\ray and asked that the ship be allo,ved to continue within Nor,vegian territorial waters.
The Foreign Office ans,vered on Oct. 25 by citing the neutrality rules. The Gern1an charge d'affaires then caine back
'vith new overtures on the follo,ving Sunday, Oct. 29.
The German Govern1nent maintained the N or,vegian
Government had supposed incorrectly that the prize should
be treated in the same 'vay as a 'varship and the Gern1an
Government was of the opinion that, according to The
Hague agreement of 1907, the prize could remain in transit
in Norwegian territorial waters 'vithout a tiine limit.
The Norwegian Foreign l\1inister ans"~erecl the next da}"
that as far as the question about transit of prizes and ''ar-
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ships, they " ·ere placed under the sa1ne footing in The
Hague agree1nent, but in this case there had not been a
(1uestion about transit but about a stay in a neutral port
and about the leaving of the port.
On the question about the transit in neutral 'vaters~ the
Foreign niinister declared himself in agreen1ent "'ith the
Gern1an GoYernment.
'This last question beca1ne effective that san1e day.
'fwo hours before the Foreign ~finister sa\v the Gern1an
charge d'affaires, the C'ity of Flint had anew entered the
harbor of 'fro1nsoe, follo,ving the \vat€rs from the north
from )!urmansk. 1'his tilne the vessel did not stop but
only asked permission to continue south. 'There \vere no
hindrances and the vessel continued southvvard in N orwegian waters.
When this became known, the possibility arose that another warfaring power would try to stop the ship on its
"~a)r. To control the boat as long as it W'as in Nor,vegian
territory and to safeguard Nor·way~s neutrality, the Nor''"egian admiral in command ordered a Norwegian naval
ship to accompany the City of Flint southward.
Farther south, the boat was met by the Olav Trygvasson,
". hich took over the watch.
Outside of Sogn (a fiord north of Bergen), the chief of the
(/ity of Flint reported a sick man aboard and said that he
should be permitted to stop at Haugesund to get the n1an
under medical treatment.
.A. doctor ·was sent aboard fro1n the Olav Trygvasson and
"·hen he had seen the sick man had only an insignificant
\vound in the leg, the chief of the City of Flint was informed he could not for this reason be pennitted to anchor
at Ha ugesund. The prize chief agreed.
The (/ity of Flint, despite this, anchored at Haugesund
on Xov. 3 in the evening and \Yhen the captain of the
Olav 1 ryg·va8son 'vent aboard and asked "~hy he put at
anchor, the prize chief ans,vered "according to orders fro1n
1ny go,·erninent ." lAtter he said he "·anted to confer 'vith the
Ger1nan Consul at Haugesund.
The Hague Agreeinent of 1907, "~hich had been ratified by
both the Gern1an and N or,vegian Governments aucl "·hich
1
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had been referred to expressly by the Gennan GoYennnent
in connection 'vith the City of Flint's stay at rfron1soe, states
in Article XXI that prizes can be taken to a neutral harbor
o"·ing "only to the inability to navigate, bad conditions at
sea~ or lack of anchors or supplies."
None of these conditions 'vas present.
If none of the conditions is present, 1\..rticlc XXII says
"the neutral po,ver must giYe free the prize "·hich has been
brought into harbor."
.
In accordance with this, the City of Fli,nt during the night
\YHS taken out of the prize coininancler's po"·er and "·as giYen
free "·hile the prize cre\v was interned ten1porarily on the

0 lav Trygvasson.
Early next morning, the City of Flint left Haugesund
On that san1e n1orning, Nov. 4, the German charge cl'af:faires at Oslo delivered to the Norwegian Foreign ~Iinis
ter a protest against the way in "\vhich K or,vegian authorities
had acted in connection with the City of Flint.
The N or"~egian Foreign l\iinister on the spot sho,ved the
protest was without reason and that N or,vegian authori6es
acted exactly in accordance with 1"he Hague agreen1ent rules.
The German Minister demanded the c~~ty of Flint be held
back as long as the case 'vas discussed bet,veen the two govcrnnle.nts, but the :Nor,vcgian Gover1unent found no legal base
on ''hich to take such steps against the American boat.
The whole action in this matter has been explained by the
N or,vegian Government in a note 'vhich today has been
delivered to the German charge d'affaires.
(NC\V York Times, N oven1ber 6, 1939.)

TREATMENT OF THE UNITED STATES MAILS

As i11 the war of 1914-18, an exchange of notes
took place during the Winter of 1939-40 bet\veen
tl1e Govern1ne11ts of the United States a11d Great
Britain on the st1bject of seizure and censorship
of tl1e mails. Tl1e A1nerican Governme11t admitted
that the British bad a right to censor private mails
which normally passed through British ports or
territory, bllt denied the Tight of Great Britain to
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interfere \vith A1nerica11 mails on neutral ships on
the l1igl1 seas or 011 sl1ips whicl1 entered British
ports i11volu11tarily. The United States Governl11ent based its case, just as it did 2'3 years before,
on Hague Conve11tion XI, \vhich specified that
]Jostal correspondence is i11violable 011 the high seas.
During the \Var of 1914-18 the American Goveri1ment had agreed that only "genuine" correspolldence \Vas immune from search and had co11ceded
that 'vl1ere n1ail \vas used as a cover for the ship111e11t of contl'aband articles it \Vas no longer '' ge11lli11e '' a11d so no lo11ger i11violable. This left ope11
tl1e question: Ho\v \Vas the belligerent (Great Britail1) to decide or to find out whether the mail was
truly ''genuine'' or not~ The practical ans\ver was
that all was subject to ope11i11g because, in effect,
tl1e belligerent had to ope11 all mail i11 order to fincl
out whether it ought to have opened the mail! The
position of the American Government \Vas thus not
a particularly strong one whe11 it came to protestillg mail censorship during the war which bega11 in
September 1939. The British in the~r reply \vere
quicl{ to point out that the United States in 1916
had already ''admitted in principle the right of the
British authorities to examine 1nail bags \vith the
view to ascertan1ing whether they contained col1trabanc1. '' The strong \Vording of the Hague Co11Ye11tion has thus been e1nasculated in practice a11cl
all correspo11de11ce, in fact, seems to be subject to
belligere11t i11terference.

A 1nerica1~ ?Lote, J wnuary 2, 1940:
"1'he United States Deparbnent of State has been advised
that British authorities have removed from British ships and
from American and other neutral ships American mails ad-
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dressed to neutral countries and have opened and censored
~ealed letter Inail sent fro1n thjs country.
·'1'he :follow·ing cases runong others ha Ye con1e to the Departinent of State's attention: On October 10 the British
authorities took from the stea1nship Black Gull 293 sacks of
.1\n1eriran Inail addressed to Rotterdam and ten sacks addressed to .A.nt,,erp. On October 12 authorities in the Downs
ren1oYed fron1 the Zaa.nda1n 77 sacks of parcel post~ 33 sacks
of registered n1ail, and 156 sacks of ordinary mail addressed
to the Netherlands, as 'veil as 65 sacks of ordinary 1nail addressed to Belgitnn, four to I.Juxemburg, three to Danzig and
259 to Ger1nany. On October 12 authorities at ,,~eyn1outh
reinoYed from the Black Tern 94 sacks of American n1ail addressed to Rotterda1n, 81 to Ant,,erp and 184 to Ger1uany.
On October 24 authorities at Kirk,,all reinoYed fron1 the
A.stJ·id-1 horden 468 bags n1ail fron1 :Ke'v York to Gothenburg and 18 bags from :Ke,v York to Helsinki. ~Iany indiYidual instances of British censorship of .1\Jnerican 1nails
ha,;e con1e to the Department's attention.
"This GoYernment readily acbnits the right of the British
Goyern1nent to censor private 1nails originating in or destined
to the United I\::ingdon1 or priv-ate mails "'"hich norn1ally pass
tlu·ough the United I\::ingdon1 for trans1nission to their final
destination. It cannot achnit the right of the British authorities to interfere w·ith 1\.merican 1nails on American or other
neutral ships on the high seas nor can it admit the right of the
British GoYernJnent to censor n1ail on ships 'vhich have involuntarily entered British ports.
"The eleYenth Hague ConYention recognizes that postal
correspondence of neutrals or belligerents is inviolable on the
high seas. The United States Govern1nent believes also that
the s:une rule obtains regarding such correspondence on ships
w·hich haYe been required by British authorities to put into a
Briti~h port. 'This vie'v is substantiated by Article 1 of the
ConYention 'vhich stipulates: 'If the ship is detained, the
correspondence is for". ardecl by the captor 'vith the least possjble delay.' 'I:'he United States Government regards as particularly objectionable the practice of taking mails fro1n
Yessels which ply directly bet,veen American and neutral
European ports and 'vhich through son1e form of duress are
1
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induced to call at designated British <:ontrol bases. This is
believed to be a clear violation of' the i1nn1unity provided by
the IIague Convention.
"The Unit eel States Government feels compelled to 1nake
a vigorous protest against the practices outlined above and to
express the hope that it will receive early assurances that they
are being discontinued."
(The Departlnent of State Bulletin, January 6, 1940, VoL
II, No. 28, Publication 1422, p. 3.)

Br-itt.sh re]Jly, J a.n1tary, 17, 1940:
"ONE. I have the honour to invite reference to your note
No. 1730 of the 27th December in which you drew attention to
certain specific instances of the removal fro1n British, United
States and other neutral ships, and of the examination by
the British censorship authorities, of United States mail addressed to neutral couHtries and of sealed letter mail despatched fron1 the United States. You also stated that your
GoYernment admitted the right of His l\fajesty's GovernInent to censor private mails originating in or destined for
the United J{ingdom or private 1nails "\vhich normally pass
through the United J{ingdom for trans1nission to their final
destination, but that in vie"\v of The Hague Convention No.
11, your Govern1nent could not achnit the right of the
British authorities to interfere with United States mail in
United States or other neutral ships on the high seas or to
censor n1ail in ships "\vhich have involuntarily entered British
ports.
"T'VO. His l\1ajesty's Government in the United ICingdonl are happy to note that there is substantial agreen1ent
bet,,een the1n and the United States Government as regards
the rights of censorship of tern1inal mails and that the only
point of difference seems to lie in the interpretation of The
Hague Convention in regard to correspondence in ships
which are diverted into British ports.
"THREE. The vie"\v of His l\1ajesty's Government as regards the exa1nination of·1nail in ships on the high seas or
involuntarily entering British ports is that the immunity
conferred by Article I of The Hague Convention No. 11,
which in any case does not cover postal parcels, is enjoyed
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only by genuine postal correspondence, and that a belligerent
is therefore at liberty to exa1nine mail bags and, if necessary,
their contents in order to assure hin1self that they constitute
such correspondence and not articles of a noxious character
such as contraband. This view n1ust, in the opinion of His
)fajesty's Govern1nent, be regarded as established by the
practice during the 'Yar of 1914-1918~ w·hen none of the
belligerents accepted the view that Article I of this convention constituted an absolute prohibition of interference 'vith
n1ail bags, and the general right to search for contraband
"~as regarded as covering a full exan1ina tion of 1nails for
this purpose. Reference to the correspondence betw·een the
United States Govern1nent and His ~fajesty's Governn1ent
in 1916 shows that at that date the United States ad1nitted
in principle the right of the British authorities to exan1ine
1nail bags with a view to ascertaining " ..hether they contained contra band.
"FOUR. It will be appreciated that the letter post as well
as the parcel post can be used to convey contraband; and
that even though letters 1nay be addressed to a neutral
country their ultimate destination may be Germany. For
instance, the letter mails 1nay be used to convey securities,
cheques or notes or again they 1nay be used to send industrial diamonds and other light contraband. It must be
ren1embered that the lin1it of size,. weight and bulk of
letters sent is sufficient to allo".. the passage of contraband
of this nature which 1nay be of the utJnost value to the
enemy.
"It was presu1nably for this reason that the United States
Government in their note of the 24th l\Iay, 1916, stnted
that "The Government of the United States is inclined to
the opinion that the class of n1ail mutter "~hich includes
stocks, bonds, coupons and similar securities is to be regarded as of the sa1ne nature as n1erchandise or other
articles of property and subject to the san1e exercise of
belligerent rights. l\Ioney orders, cheques, drafts, notes and
other negotiable instruments "rhich may pass as the equivalent of n1oney are, it is considered, also to be classed as
tnerchandise."
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"It is clear that in the case of merchandise His ~fajesty's
Government are entitled to ascertain if it is contraband
intended for the enemy or ''hether it possesses an innocent
character, and it is impossible to decide whether a sealed
letter does or does not contain such merchandise without
opening it and ascertaining what the contents are. It 'vould
be difficult to prevent the use of the letter post for the
trans1nission of contraband to Germany, a use 'vhich has
been Inade on an extensive scale, without submitting such
1nail to that very examination to 'vhich the United States
Government is taking objection.
"FIVE. The Allied govern1nents in their correspondence
'vith the United States Government in 1916 also had occasion to demonstrate the extent to 'vhich the mails 'vere being
employed for the purpose of conveying contraband articles
to Germany. The position in this respect is identical today,
and, in this connection, I have the honor to invite reference
to an aide me1noire dated the 23d November, 1939, which
was con1municated to a 1ne1nber of your staff and in 'vhich
clear evidence 'vas given of the existence of an organized
traffic in contraband on a considerable scale bet,veen German
sympathizers in the United States and Germany through
the mail.
"1\..n article in a newspaper published in German in the
United States, which was handed to him at the same time~
sho,ved that an organization existed in United States territory for the purpose of facilitating this traffic.
"SIX. Quite apart from transmission of contraband the
possibility 1nust be taken into account of the use of the letter
post by Ger1nans to trans1nit 1nilitary intelligence, to promote
sabotage and to carry on other hostile acts. It is in accordance ''ith international la 'v for belligerents to prevent intelligence reaching the enen1y 'vhich might assist them in hostile operations.
"SEVEN. I may add that in another respect, namely, the
destruction of 1nails on board ships sunk by the illegal
methods of 'varfare adopted by Ger1nany, the situation today
is identical 'vith that 'vhich existed in the 'var of 1914-1918.
Bet,-veen the 3d September, 1939, and the 9th January, 1940,
the German naval authorities have destroyed, without pre-
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Yious ""arning or Yisit, in defiance of the rnles of "·ar and of
obligations freely entered into, the S. S. Yorkshire, the S. S.
Dunbar Castle, the S. S. Sin1on Bolivar and the S. S. Terukuni :31aru, all of w·hich are known to have been carrying
1nails to or fro1n neutral countries, ''ith as little regard for
the safety of the neutral correspondence on board as for the
li ,. es of the inoffensive passengers and ere"... Yet His niajesty's Govern1nent are not aware that any protest regarding
this destruction of postal correspondence has been 1nade to
the German Government.
"EIGHT. In contrast to this reckless and indiscri1ninate
destruction of neutral property, the exan1ination conducted
by His l\fajesty's Govern1nent of the n1ails w·hich are under
discussion does not involve innocent 1nail being either confiscated or destroyed. In accordance with the terms of The
Hague Convention, 1nail found in ships which have been
diverted to British ports is forwarded to its destination as
soon as possible after its innocent nature is established. In
no case is genuine correspondence fron1 the United States
seized or confiscated by His Majesty's Government.
"NINE. For the above reasons His l\fajesty's Government
find themselves unable to share the vie". s of the United
States Govern1nent that their action in examining neutral
n1ail in British or neutral shipping is contrary to their
obligations under international law. They are, how·ever,
desirous of conducHng this examination with as little inconvenience as possible to foreign nations~ and you may rest
assured that every effort has been and will be n1ade to reduce
any delays which 1nay be occasioned by its enforcement.
"If the United States Government have occasion to bring
any specific co1nplaints to the notice of His l\fajesty's Governn1ent concerning delays alleged to be due to the exan1ination of these mails, His l\fajesty's Govern1nent w·ill be happy
to exa1nine these co1nplaints in as acco1n1nodating and
friendly a spirit as possible. ''Thile the task of exa1nination
is rendered heavy as a result, it is believed that arrangements
"~hich have been 1nade to deal with this correspondence ''ill
insure that all genuine correspondence will reach its destination in safety and with reasonable dispatch."
(The Deparhnent of State Bulletin, January 27, 1940,
Vol. II, No. 31, Publication 1428, pp. 91-93.)
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CAPTURE, ESCORT, AND CONTROL BY
WARSHIP AND AIRPLANE

In Situation I the Cruiser Bax of State B did
not place a prize cre\v on board the Elrod; instead
an airpla11e was sent out by the Bax "periodically"
to 1nake ce1-tain that the ElrorZ did not deviate.
The issue is not one of deviation before visit and
search, a proble1n \vhich \vas extensively considered
by the Commission of Jurists in 1923 a11d in Naval
''Tar College International La'v Situations in 1930
and 1938. Rather, tl1e question is one of deviation
c~Jfter capture. Under international law the commander of a belligere11t cruiser which has captured an enemy mercbant111an or seized a neutral
vessel bas the option of placing a prize crew on
board or of escorting the ship into port. What
is crucial in such a situation is that the captured or
seized vessel be under the effective control of tl1e
belligerent. A mere order to proceed to a specified destination need not be obeyed by the captured
or seized craft \Vhicb is legally free to sail where
it 'vishes if the control over it is no longer maintained. khe captured ship has no right to attempt
to escape or deviate, but if co11trol ceases the Inerchant ship is at liberty./ The belligere11t cruiser,
acting as escort, or the prize crevv, n1ust operate
i11 such a \Vay as to convince the captain of tl1e
seized ship that l1e is u11der actual constraint. Tl1e
questio11 is both one of fact and of thought as to
the fact. Objectively,4be case might be one in
\vhicb the belligerent captor did 11ot have the physical force to maintain his authority but if he perforn1ed in such a \vay as to create a reasonable
belief in the minds of those on board the capttlred
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Yessel that such authority could be Inai11taii1ecl, the11
legall~y the belligerent \vould be in control. There
is tl1e famous story about the British stea1ner A.ppcun which \vas captured in 1916 by the German
cruiser 11Ioe~ve. The Gern1ans could not spare
1na11Y n1en for a prize cre\v, and to bolster their
authority they told the British that they had 111ined
the AJJpant and could blo\v it to bits at the slightest
sig11 of insubordination. Whether the Appam was
really mined or not, and whether the English crevv
really \vould have had the power to retake comn1a11d, does not change the fact that by their actions
a11d tactics the Germans gave convincing evidence
of co11trol.
In each case of capture and seizure exan1ination
has to be made into this question of control. Catagorical assertio11s as to tl1e size of the prize cre\V
or as to the distance bet\veen the escort and the
escorted are impossible and useless. Instead, the
law must employ a rtlle of Teason, and a judicial
authority would have to decide whether n1 a given
insta11ce adequate effort had bee11 made by the captor to convince the captured that he was i11 control.
sufficient authority had been made manifest to
111ake plain to any sensible, rational person that l1e
coulcl110t proceed freely, then legally control could
be said to exist./ In the case at hand, the Bax se11ds
out the airplane periodically. This 111ight seem
at first as if control existed only \Vhen the airplane
"ras actually \vithin the sight of those on board the
Elrocl. It might be argued by some that either the
Bax or the airplane must be physically present
ever~y moment in order to maintain its authority,
a11d it is true that on the face of it, a dangerous
precedent might be set if such periodic visits \vere
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too readily condoned. The rules require tl1e belligereilt to make so1ne effort in retllrn for coi11pliance on the part of the seized or captured ship;
the la'v is a se11sible compromise bet,veen the belligerent's natural desire to capture a ship and to
go on his way after merely issuing an order, and
the merchantman's wish to break away and resume
his nor1nal course after capture. If the law i11
regard to co11trol is too greatly relaxed, grave da11-·
gers n1ay be foreseen; belligerents could capture,.
give orders, sail after other ships a11d then atte111pt
to penalize the vessels 'vhich it had 11ot bothered
to escort and which it might have reencolu1tered.
Undue advantage would thus accrue to belligere11t
'Yarships.
In the case of the Elrod} however, it is not absolutely certain that the Bax by means of its airplane
is 11ot in control. The airplane may be lool{ed
llpon as an extension of the guns of the Bax a11d
i11 tl1ese days of radio, a warship out of sight over
the horizon might escort and keep control for a
time over a merchantma11 which v.rould be withi11
the range of the warship's gu11s a11d v.rould have
reason to believe that it 'vas not "free." If the
airpla11e appeared sufficiently often, or if the warshi}) 111ade it clear that it 'vas keepli1g watch i11
effective fashion, there 'vould be no release fron1
co11trol. The poi11t at isslle is whether, u11der the
circumstances, the airplane 'vas arou11d enough to
co11vince the Elrod captain that he 'vas being
\Vatched ancl controlled. How much is '' e11ough'' ~
Ho'v often is ''sufficiently''~ These are questio11s
\vhich the con1111a11der of a 'varship or the judge
of the prize court must answer and must decide
in terms of what is reasonable in the particular
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sitnatio11. Therefore, though the actio11 of the Bax
is ope11 to grave criticisn1, and though it 1nay lool{
like an un\Yarranted attempt to prevent deviatio11
b}r 1neans of ineffective control, it 1nust be adinitted that the use of radio and airplane demands a
greater flexibility i11 the application of the old rules
\vhich required the actual physical presence of an
acco1Ilpa.nyj11g vvarship. The action of the Bax.
is 11ot necessarily illegal, a11d careful scrutiny of
all the facts n1ight reveal that there \Vas sufficient
evide11ce of control to make the Elrod}s captain
believe that the physical might of tl1e plane or
1varship could be exerted at a11y n10111ent.
RESUJ\f:E

It is plain that the rules of international law are
being profollndly affected by the social and tech11ical develop1nents of tl1e prese11t epoch. Collectivjstic tendencies are forcing a reexaini11atio11 of tl1e
fni1dH111ental postulates of neutrality, and it seems
inevitable that adjustments must be made to per111it the continllation of commerce betvvee11 belligere11ts and neutrals despite the advance of govern111ents into the terrain formerly occupied by private
enterprise alone. Lil{ewise in matters pertaining
to contraband, the maintenance of blockades and
the exercise of control over captured vessels, the
i11troduction of the airplane, of the radio, and of
other devices in this ne\v power age, raise ne\v
problems in regard to the application of the old
rules. This is not to assert that changing conditioilS or ne\v methods of \Varfare justify the abando1nne11t of former legal restraints. It does mean,
llo\vever, that inter11ationallaw, like domestic la\v,
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n1ust keep i11 tuucl1 'v1th its social, economic, and
lJolitical e11vironn1ent. La,v sta11ds for order but
it must also allo'v for change, and the task of adapting rules to shifti11g conditio11s is a 11ever-e11ding
one.
SOLUTION

( ct) State C should ca11cel or refuse to have the
agreement n1acle, thot1gh it should have the opportunity to prove that the transaction was purely
co1nn1ercial a11d nonpolitical in cl1aracter. The
evidence in this case ho,vever does not seem to
support any st1ch contention on tl1e part of State C.
(b) Visit and search of the Cora by the Byro1~
'vas legal.
(c) The Elrod is not gt1ilty of tlnneutral service. It is not impossible that the Elrod "\Vas legally
under the control of the Bax. The qt1estion l1inges
upon this point: vVas the airplane sufficiently in
evidence to co11vince the captain of the Elrod that
l1e 'vas 'vatchecl and t1nder control~

